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Automatic authorisation: an exploration of the decision to detain in police custody 
Abstract: The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 was implemented in 1986 to, inter alia, 
routinise police powers and procedures in England and Wales, and to improve protection for those 
suspected of committing a criminal offence. Yet, in the thirty years since its inception, various 
provisions within PACE have attracted fervent criticism for their ineffectiveness. Drawing upon 
empirical data collected at two custody suites in England, this paper illustrates, in line with previous 
studies, that custody officers are still failing to act as a ‘check’ on police powers and are routinely 
authorising detention. Perhaps more problematically, custody officers may go beyond authorisation and 
may assist arresting officers in finding sufficient grounds for detention. As such, in the thirty years post-
PACE, s 37 is still having little to no impact on custody practices. This paper explores the factors which 
influence the authorisation of detention and offers tentative conclusions about how the refusal or 
authorisation of detention may be regulated. 
Introduction and background 
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), which came into force in 1986, aimed to overhaul 
investigative procedures by regulating police powers and suspects’ rights. Prior to its introduction, the 
Judges’ Rules and the accompanying Administrative Directions governed the treatment of suspects1
during police investigation. However, the Judges’ Rules lacked enforceability and thereby failed to 
adequately protect individuals undergoing police investigation, as highlighted by the ‘Confait’ case.2
The Fisher report3 on the ‘Confait’ case and the earlier report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee4
culminated in the establishment of a Royal Commission for Criminal Procedure,5 which in turn led to 
the implementation of PACE. The purpose of these reforms were to ensure ‘fairness, openness and 
workability’6 through regulation of police powers and procedures. However, the reaction to PACE has 
1 For the purpose of this paper, the terms ‘suspect’ or ‘detainee’ can be used to refer to someone who has been 
detained in police custody – the former is detained under suspicion of a criminal offence, whereas the latter is 
more general and can include someone detained in police custody under suspicion of a criminal offence or 
otherwise. The term ‘arrestee’ refers to someone who has been arrested but is not yet detained in custody. These 
terms are, of course, not problem-free, in particular the term ‘suspect’ has attracted criticism as individuals are 
often detained where reasonable suspicion has not been established – see Mike McConville and Jacqueline 
Hodgson, Custodial Legal Advice and the Right to Silence (RCCJ research study no. 16) (HMSO 1993) 198. 
2 See Christopher Price and Johnathan Caplan, The Confait confessions (Marion Boyars 1977).
3 Henry Fisher, Report of an Inquiry by the Hon. Sir Henry Fisher into the Circumstances Leading to the Trial 
of three persons on Charges arising out of the death of Maxwell Confait and the fire at 27 Doggett Road, 
London SE6 (HC 1977/78 90) (Home Office 1977/78). 
4 Home Office, Criminal Law Revision Committee Eleventh Report, Evidence (General) (Cmnd 4991) (HMSO 
1972). 
5 Home Office, Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, The Investigation and Prosecution of Criminal 
Offences in England and Wales: The Law and Procedure (Cmnd 8092-1) (HMSO 1981). (Hereafter RCCP). 
6 David Brown, PACE Ten Years On, A Review of the Research (Home Office Research Study No 155). (Home 
Office 1997) 1. 
been varied – it has attracted criticism for ‘non-impact’7 on police practices, yet has also been described 
as the ‘single most significant landmark in the modern development of police powers’.8
PACE, inter alia, established the role of custody officer an officer of at least the rank sergeant who is 
responsible for the detainee’s rights and welfare whilst the detainee is in police custody.9 His role is 
regulated by PACE and the Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and Questioning of Persons 
by Police Officers,10 and is guided by the College of Policing guidance on Detention and Custody;11 he 
must ensure that the Act and the Codes are complied with12 and must provide certain pieces of 
information to the detainee upon arrival (such as the reason for detention and the detainee’s rights and 
entitlements.13 These duties must be performed as soon as practicable; failure to do so could result in a 
breach of PACE. The custody officer is also responsible for considering whether detention14 should be 
authorised; he may deprive a suspect of his or her liberty, at least in the first instance, for 24 hours.15
However, he may only do so where there is insufficient evidence and detention is therefore necessary 
to ‘secure or preserve evidence relating to an offence for which [the arrestee] is under arrest or to obtain 
such evidence by questioning him’;16 or where there is sufficient evidence for the purposes of obtaining 
a prosecutorial decision from the CPS.17 The custody officer must be sure that he ‘has reasonable 
grounds for believing that detention is necessary for these purposes.18
The consensus of the RCCP was such that ‘many suspects who were arrested and charged could be 
reported and summonsed instead’19 and therefore there should be a determination as to whether 
detention was necessary. As Sanders, Young and Burton have noted, Douglas Hurd (the then Home 
Secretary) urged that custody officers consider whether ‘detention was necessary – not desirable, 
7 Mike McConville, Andrew Sanders and Roger Leng, The Case for the Prosecution: Police Suspects and the 
Construction of Criminality. (Routledge 1991) 189. 
8 Robert Reiner, The Politics of the Police (OUP 2010) 212. 
9 PACE requires that one or more custody officers be present at a ‘designated police station’ (s 35), however the 
custody officer’s role may be carried out by an officer of any rank provided he or she is not involved in the 
investigation should the custody officer be unavailable (s 36(4)). See PACE s 36 generally. 
10 Code C (n 13).
11 College of Policing, Authorised Professional Practice on Detention and Custody (College of Policing 2013) 
<www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/detention-and-custody-2/?s=> (accessed 5 November 2016) [original 
emphasis].
12 PACE s 39.
13 See PACE ss 37(2), (3), (5) & (6)).
14 As this affords the police with considerable power, it was ‘balanced’ by the right to legal advice – see David 
Dixon, Law in Policing: Legal Regulation and Police Practices (OUP 1997) 283. There are of course problems 
with the right to legal advice. For some discussion of the issues herewith see Andrew Ashworth and Mike 
Redmayne, The Criminal Process (4th edn, OUP 2010) 93-4. 
15 Thereafter an officer of rank of superintendent or above can authorise an extension of 12 hours (PACE s 42) 
after which time a ‘warrant of further detention’ can be granted by the magistrates’ court (PACE s 43).
16 PACE s 37 (2).
17 PACE s 37(1) – (3)) and (7).
18 PACE s 37 (2) and (3).
19 Andrew Sanders, Richard Young and Mandy Burton, Criminal Justice (4th edn, OUP 2010) 215.
convenient or a good idea but necessary’.20 During the time at which PACE was being considered, 
there were concerns raised regarding the extent of police powers and there was an emphasis to 
balance police powers with individual rights. The necessity principle, as Brittan highlighted, was 
integral to the proposals of the Royal Commission and formed the basis of the Bill; there was a need 
to ensure that the police were conferred the powers required to do their job (i.e. fight crime) and that 
safeguards would off-set these powers. There were concerns, however, that the balance was being 
titled towards the police.21 Indeed, in both the Commons and the Lords, there was fervent debate 
regarding the issue of detention in police custody and the impact it would have on individual liberty. 
The power of the custody officer to detain was, nonetheless, enshrined within the law, subject to eh 
the necessity criterion. Recent guidance, provided by the College of Policing, stresses the necessity 
requirement:   
Detention is always the last resort and custody officers should authorise detention only when it is 
necessary to detain rather than when it is convenient or expedient. The decision should not be seen 
as a rubber-stamping of the necessity to arrest but as a separate independent decision’.22
The courts have engaged with the issue of necessity and reasonableness of detention in a small number 
of cases. In DPP v. L23 the court accepted that detention could be authorised routinely: the custody 
officer need not ascertain whether the arrest was lawful; he is entitled to assume as much. This decision 
was endorsed in Al-Fayed v. Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis24 where the court ‘held that 
there was no reason to think that the custody officer did not have reasonable grounds for believing that 
detention was necessary’.25 More recent decisions appear to further endorse this approach. In 
Richardson v. The Chief Constable of West Midlands Police,26 the courts seemed unwilling to interfere 
with the custody officer’s decision: the court stated that the custody officer’s role was to decide whether 
detention is necessary and not whether the arrest was necessary; his decision is independent of the 
decision to arrest and could not cure any defect in the arrest.27 The approach in Richardson was endorsed 
in Hayes v. Chief Constable of Merseyside28 where the court held that the victim’s withdrawal of a 
complaint did not by itself mean that there were no grounds to detain for the purposes of interview.29
The decision in Richardson was also endorsed in Hanningfield v. Chief Constable of Essex30 where it 
20 HC Official Report SC E 16 Feb 1984, col 1229, as cited in Sanders, Young and Burton (n 19) 216.
21 HC Deb 16 May 1984, vol 60, cc378-415.
22 College of Policing (n 11).  
23 [1999] Crim LR 752. 
24 [2004] EWCA Civ 1579.
25 Sanders, Young and Burton (n 19) 217. 
26 [2011] EWHC 733.
27 ibid at para 57. 
28 [2011] EWCA Civ 911. 
29 ibid at para 45.
30 [2013] EWHC 243.  
was held that ‘the lawfulness of the custody officer's acts must be judged in the light of his knowledge 
at the material time. He may or may not know the same facts as his colleague(s) who carried out the 
earlier arrest’.31
The intended role of the custody officer is to ensure independence, however, the reality is that the 
custody officer is nevertheless a police officer32 with both ‘institutional and collegial ties with other 
officers’.33 Whilst some researchers felt that the custody officer was sufficiently independent from the 
investigation,34 others, such as McConville, Sanders and Leng, pointed towards the lack of 
independence of the custody officer.35 The RCCJ similarly recognised that it was difficult for the 
custody officer to be independent from his colleagues (they nevertheless felt that the role of custody 
officer should continue to be performed by a police officer).36 Bound-up with his lack of independence, 
the custody officer does not necessarily thoroughly consider the necessity for detention but instead 
adopts a ‘rubber-stamping’ approach.37 For example, in McConville, Sanders and Leng’s study, custody 
officers felt that anything other than an automatic authorisation of detention would be unusual. Indeed, 
‘for [custody officers], it was not a separate decision: a person lawfully arrested would be detained’.38
Custody officers understood ‘their role in terms of ensuring that the individual had been arrested for an 
offence known to the law and then [would authorise] detention’.39
Such attitudes have not changed with time. Within this paper, I will explore the factors affecting the 
authorisation of detention, drawing upon empirical work conducted as part of a broader doctoral project. 
The findings, it should be noted, are unsurprising, particularly in light of previous studies conducted 
since the inception of PACE. As with previous studies, it is illustrated, herewith, that the custody officer 
does not provide an independent check on the police and, contrary to s 37, authorises detention 
routinely. Moreover, in addition to mere authorisation, the custody officer may also actively assist the 
arresting officer (AO) in establishing grounds for detention. Within this paper I will also offer tentative 
31 ibid at para 32.
32 McConville, Sanders and Leng (n 7) 42.
33 ibid.
34 See Mike Maguire, ‘Effects of the P.A.C.E. provisions on detention and questioning: some preliminary 
findings’ (1988) 28 (1) British Journal of Criminology 19; Barrie Irving and Ian McKenzie, Police 
Interrogation: The Effects of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (The Police Foundation, 1989).
35 McConville, Sanders and Leng (n 7). 
36 Home Office, Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Report (Cm 2263) (HMSO 1993) 30.
37 Vicky Kemp, ‘PACE, performance targets and legal protections’ (2014) 4 Crim LR 278; Coretta Phillips and 
David Brown, Entry into the Criminal Justice System: A Survey of Police Arrests and their Outcomes (Home 
Office Research Study No 185) (Home Office 1998) 49; Brown (n 7); McConville, Sanders and Leng (n 7) 44; 
Ian McKenzie, ‘Helping the Police with Their Inquiries: The Necessity Principle and Voluntary Attendance at 
the Police Station’ [1990] Crim LR 22, 24; Keith Bottomley, Clive Coleman, David Dixon, Martin Gill, and 
David Wall, The Impact of PACE: Policing a Northern Force (Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, 
University of Hull 1989)  89.
38 McConville, Sanders and Leng (n 7) 44.
39 ibid. 
recommendations regarding how the ‘rubber-stamping’ of detention may be counteracted, based upon 
empirical data. 
Methods 
The data explored within this paper was gathered as part of a larger doctoral project, focusing on 
vulnerability and implementation of the appropriate adult (AA) safeguard.40 As decisions on the AA 
safeguard are made after detention is granted, it was imperative that I record whether detention was 
indeed granted. Non-participant observation was conducted in two sites for approximately three months 
at each (with in excess of 200 observations across the two sites). The custody suites were chosen on the 
basis of size and practicality (at Site 1 through informal links with a senior gatekeeper; and at Site 2 
through an opportune meeting with another senior gatekeeper) and ethics approval was granted prior to 
research commencing on the basis that informed consent was obtained from the officers. Consent was 
obtained from a total of 31 custody officers (from Site 1, 20 custody officers (CO1-20) and from Site 
2, 11 custody officers (CO21-24, 27-31, 33)) to observe them at the booking-in desk and at any other 
relevant points within the police custodial process.41 Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
15 officers from Site 1 and 8 from Site 2 towards the end of the observation period, and lasted an average 
of 41 and 43 minutes at Sites 1 and 2 respectively. This paper uses both observational and interview 
data (although it should be noted that the authorisation of detention was not explicitly discussed in every 
interview) and the data was analysed through computer-assisted qualitative data analysis.42 Within the 
interviews I did not ask questions on the authorisation of detention. Instead, custody officers offered 
much of this information unprompted (for example, when discussing their role). The findings below 
are, therefore, tentative. However, through triangulation, i.e. combining what was observed with what 
was discussed at interview, I am able to offer a robust exploration of the detention decision, yet also 
offers some new insights to the question of how and why custody officers authorise or refuse to 
authorise detention.  
The role of the custody officer in authorising detention 
As noted above, the custody officer must decide whether detention should be authorised, pursuant to s 
37 PACE. Further, as also noted above, custody officer are nevertheless police officers. During 
observations, it was clear that custody officers were acutely aware of their role within the organisation: 
whilst they knew they had to be independent, they were nevertheless police officers: 
40 Home Office, Revised Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and Questioning of Persons by Police 
Officers. Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984, Code C. (Crown 2014). (Hereafter Code C).  
41 I spent most, if not all, of my time at the booking-in desk. 
42 The data was collected and analysed initially through a grounded theory approach – Kathy Charmaz, 
Constructing Grounded Theory (SAGE 2006). However, for this paper thematic analysis was used. 
I’m sure in time there will be a change and it won’t be police or custody sergeants or a police officer 
who does a custody sergeant’s job but [someone who is] independent of the police service and all 
those things (CO27 Interview, June 2015). 
As noted above, this lack of independence impacts upon whether the custody officer is able to 
effectively perform his role. In relation to detention, this lack of, or reduced, independence can influence 
the custody officers approach to authorisation. The authorisation of detention was, according to some 
custody officers, part of the role. During this project, I observed not one single refusal to detain when 
the arrestee has been brought to the booking-in desk. Moreover, detention was typically authorised with 
little or no deliberation. Authorising detention (rather than considering the necessity of detention) was 
seen as integral to the role of the custody officer. For example, when asked about his role at interview, 
CO28 explained: 
I’m a trained custody sergeant. I’ve been on a four-week custody course which gave me the 
qualification to come into police custody and act as a custody sergeant i.e. authorise detention and 
all the powers that go with it (CO28 Interview, June 2015). 
CO11 also stated that his ‘role [was] to authorise detention for people that’s been arrested for various 
offences, make sure that the arrest has been necessary in the first place, if it is then I authorise detention’ 
(CO11 Interview, February 2015). The question for CO11 was not whether detention was necessary, 
but whether he felt the arrest was necessary. 
Institutional (in)dependence? 
As aforementioned, the custody officer has both ‘institutional and collegial ties with other officers’.43
These institutional ties are particularly binding when the custody officer is considering whether to 
authorise detention. It is not simply that he feels a bond with other officers; it is that he is structurally 
disadvantaged by virtue of his position in the organisational hierarchy. Put simply, he may be overruled 
by someone more senior that he.44 As CO13 noted (when discussing his past refusals to authorise 
detention):  
They’ll say, ‘Well I’ll contact my sergeant’. It’s often the CID [Criminal Investigation Department] 
– this idea that I’m one particular part of the organisation that I fall for it, and I quite often come up 
43 McConville, Sanders and Leng (n 7) 42.
44 See also Kemp (n 35). See PACE s 39(6).
against one particular branch of the CID – and then they want to refer things to their DI [Detective 
Inspector] and their DI then will then talk to me [and] then refer it onto their DCI [Detective Chief 
Inspector] and, at the end of the day, it goes up to superintendent and the superintendent can overrule 
me, if he or she wants (CO13 Interview, February 2015). 
Whilst custody officers felt that they were very much distinct from other areas of policing, they also 
felt that they could be easily overruled by more senior officers. This in turn produced a conflict – they 
felt a tension between complying with the law and complying with the orders of their superiors: 
The arguments that will ensue because you wouldn’t authorise detention for something. Because we 
… we’re separate from divisional officers, so we’re seen as the enemy to some extent, sometimes…
We should be on their side, but we’ve got to stick to the law as well. I mean, I’m not saying that 
they’re breaking laws by making arrests but we’ve got to be totally independent of it so we can’t 
side with them. Just because a person’s a criminal, don’t mean they should be arrested. And we 
know that sometimes we say ‘I’m not authorising detention on this’ but they’re onto the sergeant, 
who’s on to their DI, who’s on to their superintendent, who’s phoning us, explaining, asking us, 
demanding from us why we’ve not done it (CO11 Interview, February 2015). 
The institutional structure undermines the custody officer’s ability to say ‘no’; he cannot be independent 
because he is not allowed to be. The issue of support in relation to decision-making was also raised at 
interview: 
I think that if I made decisions for the right reasons then I would be supported and I’d like to think 
I’m supported there. I get into trouble with refusing to authorise detention. I’ve got into trouble with 
that in the past and I’ve not been particularly well supported but at the end of the day there’s been 
no kickback from it. I’ve expected to be hung and quartered for it when I came on duty and they’ve 
thought, they’ve looked at it, and they’ve thought that ‘he’s right’. They’ve just left it, nothing’s 
happened (CO13 Interview, February 2015). 
That custody officers may be challenged or may face criticism for their decisions merely serves to 
undermine their (already fragile) independence. They are in a particularly difficult position: authorise 
detention contrary to s 37 and therefore breach the PACE provisions, or refuse to authorise detention 
and thereby infuriate their colleagues, and potentially face overthrow or denunciation. 
However, the custody officer may go beyond rubber-stamping the decision and may actually collude 
with the AO to ensure that there are sufficient grounds to detain, as the following example illustrates: 
Arrestee is suspected of aggravated burglary. AO states that arrestee fits the ‘description’ and was 
suspected of an offence on a particular (unspecified) day and then the following day. AO seems 
unsure about what he is saying. CO15 feels that the grounds are quite weak and indicates discomfort 
with authorising detention. AO does not bolster his account and reiterates the information already 
provided. CO15 seems unwilling to accept this and asks a detention officer to take arrestee away. 
CO15 then turns to AO and said ‘we need to have a chat; you’re not convincing me that he needs to 
be booked in at the moment’. AO again explains alleged offence. CO15 advises AO that the 
information provided, as it stood, was not enough to ‘nick’ the arrestee. CO15 suggests, however, 
that AO could ‘link’ the offences as this would strengthen the case for detention. CO15 states “I’m 
all for booking him in but we need more information”. AO still is not presenting enough information 
for CO15 to detain. CO15 then suggests that they go somewhere else to talk.45 CO15 and AO chat 
for a few minutes. AO is overheard giving the same account and CO15 is overheard guiding AO on 
what would be sufficient to detain the arrestee. CO15 and AO return to the booking-in desk and the 
arrestee is brought back. CO15 explains to arrestee that the law requires that detention is authorised 
on reasonable grounds and necessity should be established before detention is granted. CO15 
explains to arrestee that the custody officer must be satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for 
detention but the custody officer does not have to explain to arrestee how the decision is made. 
Detention was authorised. (Site 1, Interaction 90, December 2014). 
In this instance, CO15 is not acting as an independent check on the AO but instead enabling the AO to 
construct a plausible account so that detention could be granted. As McConville, Sanders and Leng 
have highlighted, the question for the custody officer is not so much whether detention should be 
authorised but rather how it could be justified.46 This interaction illustrates this. 
PACE, pressure and performance targets47
One must also consider the wider context within which these decisions are made. One particular impact 
on the ‘rubber-stamping’ of detention has been the enduring impact of the, now abolished, ‘offences 
brought to justice targets’, which have since been replaced, in some forces, with institutional 
performance measures.48 The effect of performance targets has placed AOs under pressure, which, in 
turn, has impacted negatively upon custody officers: 
45 There is both CCTV and audio-recording in operation at the booking-in desk. CO15 undoubtedly wanted to 
evade the audio-recording. 
46 McConville, Sanders and Leng make the point that PACE is not evaded by the police but instead used by 
them (n 7) 43. 
47 For an excellent discussion of the effect of performance targets on police custody see Kemp (n 37). As noted, 
the ‘offences brought to justice’ targets were abolished in 2010 but it seems that old habits die hard in some 
police forces. 
48 See Kemp (n 37).
There is a volume to it. But the response officers are under pressure from their sergeants to go out 
and make arrests. I’m told they don’t do performance figures anymore but I think they still do. And 
the response sergeants are under pressure from their own command teams, from superintendent 
outwards. The easiest one to look at is domestic violence, yes it is a serious crime and should be 
investigated; but does every single domestic violence case need to be arrested? It’s down to the 
officer’s discretion whether they arrest but they have to jump through so many hoops… to explain 
why they haven’t [arrested] that the simplest thing to do is to arrest every single time and quite a 
few times they don’t need to arrest that person. It’s the same with shop theft and every other offence. 
They just make the arrest rather than think outside the box and do it [in] other ways. They’re 
supposed to have discretion; I think the age of discretion for a lot of things is gone. And it’s probably 
gone more because of a back-covering thing rather than anything else. They’re worried if they don’t 
make the arrest, they got to try to cover their back another way. So they should make the arrest, I’m 
done. And when they get to us, if we refuse to authorise detention that’s our fault, not their fault, 
they’ve done their bit (CO11 Interview, February 2015).49
The lack of discretion exercised during arrest means that many more individuals are entering the custody 
suite than perhaps should be. This, in turn, creates a busy environment where the custody officer is 
placed under extreme pressure. As noted above, custody officers may face opposition from senior 
officers if they refuse to authorise detention. Yet, it also takes time to raise an objection, and time is 
something that staff in the custody suite do not always have in great abundance: 
On a daily basis, you’re put under this immense pressure of having this huge queue of people waiting 
to be dealt with, whilst being responsible for the ten or so people behind your doors and be 
responsible for anything that might happen to that person and sometimes you might not even know 
where that person is at for six or seven hours because you’ve been so busy with other things… You 
keep saying to yourself ‘I’m going to deal with this one and that’s it’ and you’ve constantly got 
someone in your cells who’s kicking off so you’ve got to go down to him but you’re still in the 
middle of this and you’ve still got that waiting from earlier… and it just descends into mad chaos 
(CO11 Interview, February 2015). 
The custody officer may also have other issues to contend with. Their role is not simply to decide upon 
detention – they must also risk-assess the detainee upon booking-in (sometimes taking up to 40-50 
49 As Hoyle has highlighted, mandatory or pro-arrest policies may be contrary to the victim’s wishes and may 
actually place the victim in greater danger. Further, victims may not necessarily want the perpetrator to be 
prosecuted but often an arrest gives the victim some much needed respite – see Carolyn Hoyle, Negotiating 
Domestic Violence (Clarendon Press 1998).  
minutes per detainee);50 comply with procedures such as the CPS Charging Guidance and procedures 
contained within the Mental Health Act (MHA) 1983;51 and, if required, call an AA for a vulnerable 
suspect,52 obtain a legal representative upon request from the suspect,53 obtain a healthcare professional 
(HCP) or forensic medical examiner (FME),54 or contact the suspect’s nominated person.55 These 
demands, whilst not excusatory, may explain why the custody officer does not carefully consider 
whether it is indeed necessary to detain. These issues may be further compounded by the fact that the 
custody officer may have received merely minimal training56 and some may not frequently act as 
custody officers.57
The capacity of the custody suite 
Capacity posed a particular problem at Site 1. As CO9, when discussing the size of the suite, stated, 
‘It’s too big, in my opinion. You know, you can’t run a suite effectively with that number of cells’ (CO9 
Interview, February 2015). Not only can the capacity of the custody can increase the pressure which 
the custody officer faces, it may also impact upon the custody officer’s ability (or rather lack thereof) 
to refuse detention: 
I think the other problem that this place has got is that nobody ever rings to say, ‘We’re up, we’re 
coming in’, they just turn up… [whereas] other suites, in the county do that; they’ll ring to say. The 
method that they enter the suite is via a door, which is controlled by the custody staff (CO9 Interview, 
February 2015).  
Pressures within the custody suite then culminate to undermine the ‘independence’ of the custody 
officer: 
50 See John Coppen, 'PACE: A View From the Custody Suite’ in Ed Cape and Richard Young (eds) Regulating 
Policing: the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 – Past, Present and Future (Hart 2008) 85. The element of 
the booking-in procedure that involved face-to-face interaction between the custody officer and the detainee 
typically took 5-15 minutes (except where language line was being used). Where the custody officer had to contact 
an AA, a legal representative, an HCP, or an FME this process could take much longer.  
51 Coppen (n 50) 85-8.
52 Code C (n 40).
53 PACE s 58.
54 Code C (n 40); College of Policing (n 11). 
55 PACE s 56.
56 See Coppen (n 50) 82-3. Custody officers in the suites studied had been provided with an initial custody 
officer training course (but for some this was close to 20 years ago). At Site 1, there was regular training on 
detainee safety and welfare, and some additional online training. At Site 2 most of the training seemed to be 
conducted through online modules. 
57 See Michael Zander, Zander on PACE: The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (5th edn, Sweet and 
Maxwell 2005) 136. In this two suites studied all custody officers were performing this role permanently, for at 
least a period of 6 months at time of study. Some had been custody officers for around 20 years.  
Sometimes it’s the easy way out just to go ‘I’ll authorise detention’ because I’ll save all that battle. 
Because I’ve got this big queue waiting and I’ve still got to do this and I’ve still got to do that and 
sort the queue. I just haven’t got the time to fight (CO11 Interview, February 2015). 
The above discussion provides reasons as to why detention is often authorised. It must, however, be 
recognised that detention is not always authorised: there may indeed be instances where the custody 
officer refuses to authorise detention. In the discussion below I explore these reasons. It is also worth 
noting that these reasons can be considered when deliberating how best to regulate detention.   
Weak grounds and welfare considerations58
The discussion thus far has centred on detention being routinely authorised. Whilst the above example 
(CO15) indicates that custody officers may act so as to justify detention where the grounds are weak, 
there may be others who are unwilling to do so. This is particularly the case when: 
The grounds aren’t there… I think the grounds for arrest are really spurious, there’s no evidence that 
would realistically link this person to the crime. I say, ‘I’m not doing it, I’m sorry, I’m not doing it’ 
(CO13 Interview, February 2015). 
At interview, CO11, CO13, and CO28 discussed refusing to authorise detention: CO28 suggested that 
it could be refused, hypothetically, if the arrestee had learning difficulties or if he did not feel the 
requirements were met (CO28 Interview, June 2015), CO11 felt he would refuse if it was ‘blatant that 
they shouldn’t be here’ (CO11 Interview, February 2015), and CO13 stated that he had refused to 
authorise detention in the past.59
Detention may be (and should be) refused where the grounds are not satisfied, however, it may also be 
refused for other reasons. These refusals hold important lessons when exploring how we may potentially 
‘rectify’ the blanket authorisation of detention by police custody officers. The one occasion that 
detention was refused is noted below: 
Custody officer is overheard speaking to an AO over the phone. As I can only hear CO29’s side of 
phone call could be heard, I decide to speak to him when he is finished with his call. I ask him to 
explain what had happened and he tells me that the AO had arrested a 15-year-old for possession of 
cannabis and had asked whether he could bring the suspect in for questioning. CO29 informed AO 
58 On the issue of welfare and detention see Dehaghani (online).
59 CO13 did not seem to mind conflict with other officers provided he felt he was justified in making his 
decision. 
that he was refusing to authorise detention because ‘we shouldn’t have a 15-year-old overnight in a 
cell’. CO29 suggested that street bail and, potentially, a cannabis caution would be a more 
appropriate response (Site 2, Observation and Discussion with CO29, May 2015). 
There are a number of noteworthy elements here. The first concerns the characteristics of the arrest and 
the individual under ‘arrest’ – there has been a drive to reduce the numbers of young people entering, 
and spending time in, police custody,60 and disposal options were available to the AO by virtue of the 
offence (possession of cannabis) and the ‘arrestee’ (young suspect, first offence). Moreover, and 
perhaps more importantly, the AO asked CO29 if he could bring the 15-year-old into custody and the 
interaction did not occur face-to –face in the custody suite (by which time the AO would have made the 
decision that he wanted to detain the individual) but instead over the telephone. It is therefore plausible 
to suggest that the same approach may not have been adopted in respect of an adult or in respect of a 
young suspect who had been brought into the custody suite. The custody officer, in this instance, was 
not undermining the authority or questioning the judgment of his co-worker.61 It is undoubtedly more 
difficult to refuse a request in person and, moreover, the approach was more conversational (i.e. can I 
bring him in?) rather than transactional (i.e. book this ‘prisoner’ in, please). 
The interaction above illustrates that a different approach to detention (i.e. refusal rather than rubber-
stamping) may be taken where there are welfare considerations.62 Yet, this was not always the case. For 
example, the nature of the offence might impact upon whether the young person is detained in custody:  
If you get a juvenile that comes into custody at eleven o’clock at night and they’re fit for interview 
and there’s no family member that will come out, then you’ve got to make a decision. Do we keep 
them in custody or do we bail them to come back in the morning when we can get an appropriate 
adult? Well, depending on the nature of the offence, more often than not, they’re kept in custody 
(CO9 Interview, February 2015). 
Perhaps what was therefore important about the above interaction (Site 2, Observation and Discussion 
with CO29, May 2015) was that a disposal option was available. Yet, what was ostensibly more 
60 See BBC News (2013), ‘Overnight child custody must end, says charity’ < www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
24513085> (accessed 18 February 2016); College of Policing, Children and young persons (College of Policing 
2013) <www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/detention-and-custody-2/detainee-care/children-and-young-
persons/> (accessed 18 February 2016).
61 McConville, Sanders and Leng (n 7) 43.
62 ‘From a welfare perspective, [police custody] can be an opportunity to intervene in someone’s life when they 
are in crisis, directing them to helping agencies and perhaps even diverting them from the criminal process 
altogether’ – see Layla Skinns, Andrew Wooff and Amy Sprawson, ‘Preliminary findings on police custody 
delivery in the twenty-first century: It is ‘good’ enough?’ (2015) Policing and Society, DOI: 
10.1080/10439463.2015.1058377, 1. 
important was the approach of the AO. The following example further exemplifies the importance of 
‘welfare’ and the agreement of the AO when refusing to authorise detention:  
CO33 discusses the example of 75-year-old man who was brought in for drunk driving. CO33 
decided, along with AOs, not to detain the man overnight as it was ‘too traumatic’. He was charged
even though he was intoxicated, and was taken home and left in the care of his wife (Site 2, 
Discussion, May 2015). 
Within this interaction, it is worth noting that, not only was there a welfare consideration, i.e. the officers 
did not want to detain this man overnight as it would be ‘traumatic’ for him, there was also a risk 
consideration, i.e. that detaining an elderly individual who is drunk might increase the risk of harm, 
serious injury, or death.63 Moreover, as with the scenario above (Site 2, Observation and Discussion 
with CO29, May 2015), the custody officer was not questioning the AO’s decision – in this case they 
decided together that taking the man back home to his wife would be the best option.  
Welfare is not, however, always a consideration. As CO11 noted at interview (above), cases involving 
domestic violence require action. The following interaction illustrates this: 
CO2 is booking-in an arrestee who has undergone a tracheotomy, is alcohol dependant, and is 
dying from terminal cancer. He was allegedly the perpetrator of a domestic dispute (although it 
appears that it has since been resolved, as his wife has arrived at the custody suite and is concerned 
for her husband’s welfare). The, now detained, individual is struggling to breathe and speak and, as 
a result, the booking-in procedure is taking quite some time (around 50-60 minutes of face-to-face 
interaction). When asked whether he has self-harmed in the past, he answers ‘yes’ but claims to be 
no longer suicidal now that he is facing death. During the risk assessment, he brings out a mirror 
and a pair of tweezers and starts fidgeting in the tracheotomy. It appears that something has lodged 
in the tracheotomy pipe whilst he was answering the custody officer’s questions. He appears to be 
exhausted at the end of the booking-in procedure. He is deemed fit to detain and fit for interview 
by the HCP (Site 1, Interaction 47, November 2014).  
Although welfare, in the above instance, did not result in a refusal of detention, CO2 did mention, at 
interview, that welfare considerations may result in refusals in the future: 
63 Both those who have consumed alcohol and those who are elderly are deemed to be at greater risk in police 
custody – see College of Policing (n 11). 
Offences that were summary offences where they had no power of arrest, it made them all of a 
sudden that they had got a power of arrest. I’ve now seen, it probably is Safer Detention driven, but 
more Code G driven. Because officers use it as a blanket to ‘Let’s just nick everybody’ as we were 
discussing earlier, for them to resolve everything. I’ve now seen the beginning of a sea change and 
whether that’s going to change things massively over the next few years; not just the necessity to 
arrest but now we’ve seen an adoption of an attitude, is it necessary to detain? We automatically 
detain people just because they’ve been arrested, a few years ago… Because someone’s arrested, 
it’s just natural that you as a custody sergeant just book them in. You did it without question or a 
great deal of thought. And now, we’re into these realms of, an officer might have deemed that it is 
necessary to arrest and I sit there and think, ‘Does this person really need to be here? Do they actually 
need to be under arrest for us to go through this process?’ (CO2 Interview, February 2015).  
The opportunity to observe officers for close to three months enabled me to ascertain that they are not 
yet, at least on the occasions that I observed, refusing to authorise detention. However, as noted above, 
some policies and procedures, particularly those with a welfare or risk focus, are having a positive 
impact on whether custody officers refuse to authorise detention. This will be discussed in greater detail 
below. 
The unworkability of necessity 
Perhaps it is also worth noting, before exploring the tentative recommendations, that necessity, as a 
criterion, is not necessarily workable. Sanders, Young and Burton have briefly explored the problem 
with an interpretation of ‘necessary’ and have contrasted this with ‘convenient or desirable’. They argue 
that necessity equates to there being ‘no other practicable way of gathering, securing or preserving 
evidence in relation to the offence in question’64 whereas convenience or desirability connotes cost-
effectiveness or increasing ‘the probability of confession’.65 If custody officers were to grant detention 
on the basis of necessity:
there should be proportionately few authorisations of detention [because] a determination that 
there was insufficient evidence to charge would ordinarily be coupled with a decision that such 
evidence could be obtained in ways that did not require the detention of the arrestee.66
64 Sanders, Young and Burton (n 19) 216.
65 ibid.
66 ibid.
Accordingly, ‘the presumption in s 37(2) would then apply, and the custody officer would then be 
obliged to release the arrestee on bail or unconditionally’.67 The reality would be such that a ‘large 
number of perfectly lawful arrests [would be] negatived by custody officers refusing to authorise 
detention’.68 This would, in turn, render s 37 PACE, as a rule, somewhat impractical. Perhaps it is then 
understandable that custody officers do not take ‘necessity’ into consideration when detaining 
individuals.69 The courts have condoned the rubber-stamping approach70 thereby sending the signal that 
the necessity criteria is, essentially, unnecessary. 
Counteracting the rubber-stamping approach: recommendations 
As noted above, the necessity criteria is somewhat unworkable – if it were deployed accurately, i.e. by 
being given its natural meaning, then there would be few authorisations of detention. A breach of s 37 
is inevitable if one wishes not to challenge one’s co-workers or irritate one’s superiors. Yet, there are a 
number of reasons why detention may be refused. The first is that the grounds for authorisation are 
simply not present. Given the institutional restraints on refusal and the unwillingness to challenge a co-
worker, it is perhaps only the boldest of custody officers who will refuse to detain. Detention may also 
be refused on welfare grounds i.e. that risk assessment and ‘Safer Detention’71 exert greater influence 
over custody officers’ decisions than PACE:
The bigger impacting thing on a day to day basis, for me, is Safer Detention rather than PACE; not 
in the investigation of detainees but of how we supervise and look after them. That’s the biggest 
change that has happened in custody within the last eight and a half years. There was a lot of onus 
on complying with PACE to make sure that we didn’t lose investigations and that things were done 
properly. And I would argue now that the greater focus and greater priority is care of these people 
whilst they’re in detention (CO2 Interview, February 2015). 
The problem with relying on the welfare argument is that officers may decide to interview outside of 
the (albeit minimal) custodial safeguards: 
67 ibid.
68 ibid.
69 For the impact of rules on police decision-making see Richard V Ericson, ‘Rules in Policing: Five 
Perspectives’ (2007) 11(3) Theoretical Criminology 367.
70 Sanders, Young and Burton (n 19) 216. 
71 See Association of Chief Police Officers, Guidance on the Safer Detention and Handling of Persons in Police 
Custody. (ACPO NPIA 2006); Association of Chief Police Officers Guidance on the Safer Detention and 
Handling of Persons in Police Custody. (ACPO NPIA 2012). This has since been superseded by College of 
Policing (n 11). 
It might be an officer’s attitude now, with us clamping down on the necessity to detain and should 
this person really be in a police station, police officers are more likely not to bring in vulnerable 
mental health issues and are we going to miss things because of that? (CO2 Interview, February 
2015). 
It is therefore unclear whether a greater focus on welfare would discourage automatic authorisations of 
detention and thereby encourage greater use of the ‘voluntary’ interview (which is usually anything but 
voluntary), or whether officers would seek evidence through other means (i.e. without resorting to 
interviewing the arrestee).  
Another factor that may impact upon whether detention is authorised is the capacity of the custody suite. 
One notable difference between Site 1 and Site 2 was the number of cells – the former had well over 80 
(with ‘spill-over’ there were in excess of 100 cells) and the latter had under 40. This meant that there 
would always be room for arrestees at Site 1, however, particularly on Friday and Saturday evenings, 
there would not be enough room at Site 2. Both the extra room in the suite and the busyness of the suite 
may impact upon whether the custody officer is willing to refuse detention: 
If it was in a smaller suite maybe I’d have the time to fight, you’d think ‘I’m not having it’. But here 
you just are under massive pressure, I haven’t got the time to fight so it’s just easier to go ‘Yeah, 
come on’ and you just chuck out the blatant ones (CO11 Interview, February 2015). 
The issue of capacity impacted particularly upon the approach taken by the AOs. As noted earlier, AOs 
simply turned-up at the custody suite at Site 1 (see CO9 Interview, February 2015) but at Site 2, by 
contrast (and as noted in Observation and Discussion with CO29, May 2015), calls would sometimes 
be made to the custody suite before the arrestee was brought in. This meant that officers would ask
whether they can bring the arrestee into custody and this interaction would not be face-to-face (so as 
not to affront the AO). Further, the AO has not yet made the decision to bring the arrestee into custody 
and, as such, the custody officer is not challenging his authority (as he would be if the officer had 
brought the arrestee to the custody suite) but instead replying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a question. Upon this 
basis, it could be suggested that the internal policies on refusing or granting detention could be changed 
so as to ensure that fewer individuals are entering the custody suites and so that custody officers feel 
more comfortable when refusing to authorise detention: 
It’s a cultural thing, especially within this force, that empowerment for the officer to make that 
decision or have the courage to ring through and be directed by the custody officer, because they 
don’t take it as an affront. And a lot of the calls, we don’t even get calls because they’ve made the 
decision. Or during the investigation their own sergeant has said ‘there’s no way we’re going to nick 
them and take them into custody’. Now, it may be they’ve done that because they’re high 
maintenance and they don’t want to be lumbered with that – that may play a part of it – or because 
the offence was so low level that actually, we have got other disposals for this… But now, officers 
have got the confidence to ring through and be questioned. And even sergeants on the scene have 
said ‘Nick those two and bring them in’ but, once I’ve heard the circumstances, I’ve said ‘no, I’m 
not authorising. I’m going to say something’. But I don’t know about other forces (CO28 Interview, 
June 2015).  
Conclusions: the conflict for a custody officer 
Particular elements of PACE, and most notably the necessity criteria, have been ‘easily absorbed by the 
police’72 and PACE has operated in a manner which is largely presentational.73 A number of challenges 
face the custody officer – he may not want to question his co-workers74 and may therefore grant 
detention. He may face other pressures within the custody suite such as high numbers of detainees or 
short-staffing,75 and may therefore find it easier to simply rubber-stamp detention. And, whilst the 
custody officer may view himself as independent, the organisation does not necessarily always treat 
him as such – he must work under the direction of, or under threats or intimidation from, his superiors.76
It is therefore not simply his collegial ties which compromise his autonomy; his institutional ties may 
be those which provide the greater bind.77 The custody officer is, in some instances, forced into 
facilitation. Therefore, whilst PACE requires that detention must be carefully considered (and granted 
only if necessary and on reasonable grounds), in reality it is authorised automatically.78
Within this paper I have explored how authorisation, in line with earlier studies, is routinely authorised, 
also illustrating, perhaps only anecdotally, how the custody officer may facilitate the AO in constructing 
a likely story so that detention can be authorised. Whilst the observational data suggests that requests 
are unlikely to be refused at the custody suite, the interview data suggests that some officers may refuse 
to authorise detention. Further, the observations and interviews suggest that there are (albeit only a 
small number of) refusals prior to arrival at the custody suite. 
72 McConville, Sanders and Leng (n 7) 189.
73 Reiner (n 8); Dixon (n 14) 94; McConville, Sanders and Leng (n 7); McKenzie (n 37). See generally Policy 
Studies Institute, Police and people in London; iv, David J. Smith and Jeremy Gray, The police in action (Policy 
Studies Institute 1983).
74 McConville, Sanders and Leng (n 7) 43.
75 See Bottomley, Coleman, Dixon, Gill and Wall (n 37) 116.
76 See Kemp (n 37).
77 See McConville, Sanders and Leng (n 7) 42.
78 Kemp (n 37); Philips and Brown (n 37) 49; McConville, Sanders and Leng (n 7) 44; McKenzie (n 37) 24; 
Bottomley, Coleman, Dixon, Gill and Wall (n 37) 89.
Changing policy and procedures,79 as well as pressure from outside groups, such as the Howard League 
for Penal Reform,80 may have encouraged, and may continue to encourage, the exercise of greater 
caution when authorising detention. For example, when discussing detention (although initially in 
reference to how the police pick up the ‘slack’ for the NHS), CO2 noted that there was perhaps ‘the 
beginning of a sea change’ whereby there is an ‘adoption of an attitude, is it necessary to detain?’ (see 
CO2 Interview, February 2015 above).  
Adoption of practices, such as making a call through to custody to ask the custody officer is he is able 
to detain, may ensure greater compliance with the spirit, if not also the letter, of PACE. A reduction or 
adaptation may be further facilitated by reducing the number of cells in the custody suite so that AOs 
are required to ask if detention in custody is possible. This, of course, will not ensure that detention is 
refused where the grounds are not met but it may reduce the numbers of individuals brought into 
custody.81 Regulation may not occur through PACE but could be achieved through other means.82
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